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J. S. Mill’s Conception of Utility1
B E N S A U N D E R S2
Corpus Christi College, University of Oxford3
Mill’s most famous departure from Bentham is his distinction between higher and lower4
pleasures. This article argues that quality and quantity are independent and irreducible5
properties of pleasures that may be traded off against each other – as in the case of quality6
and quantity of wine. I argue that Mill is not committed to thinking that there are two7
distinct kinds of pleasure, or that ‘higher pleasures’ lexically dominate lower ones, and8
that the distinction is compatible with hedonism. I show how this interpretation not only9
makes sense of Mill but allows him to respond to famous problems, such as Crisp’s Haydn10
and the oyster and Nozick’s experience machine.11
12
Mill identifies himself as a utilitarian, in the tradition of his father13
and Jeremy Bentham, but departs from and modifies their doctrines in14
many ways. One of his most radical revisions is the distinction between15
higher and lower pleasures, which I attempt to make sense of here.16
What follows is merely an attempt at interpretation; I endeavour to17
show that my reading can be supported by Mill’s texts, but concede18
that other remarks may seem to contradict the reading offered here.19
Ultimately, the truth may be that Mill never perfectly reconciled his20
Benthamite and non-Benthamite influences into a fully consistent21
system.122
I. TERMINOLOGY23
I take utilitarianism to be that form of consequentialism that aims24
to promote (usually, but not necessarily, to maximize) happiness. So25
defined, utilitarianisms form a subset of consequentialist theories, but26
there is room for variation not only between, for example, act-, rule-27
and motive-utilitarianisms but also different conceptions of happiness28
or well-being. (By ‘happiness’ I intend a place-holder, like the Greek29
eudaimonia, which is equivalent to well-being and not biased towards30
hedonistic interpretations.)31
The three most prominent theories of well-being, each itself32
admitting numerous variations, are (i) hedonistic theories, (ii) desire-33
satisfaction theories and (iii) objective-list (perfectionist) theories.34
Thus it is possible to be, for example, a hedonistic utilitarian – like35
1 Tensions between ‘Benthamite’ and ‘Aristotelian’ influences are noted by Andrew
Levine, Engaging Political Philosophy: From Hobbes to Rawls (Malden, Mass., 2002),
pp. 142–3; Stephen Darwall, Philosophical Ethics (Oxford, 1998), p. 118.
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Bentham – or a utilitarian subscribing to a desire-satisfaction view, as36
suggested by Ayer,2 or a perfectionist about individual well-being. To37
say that Mill is a utilitarian therefore leaves open his understanding38
of pleasure and happiness.39
II. HEDONISM AND PLEASURE40
Mill explicitly associates himself with Bentham’s hedonism, declaring41
that ‘By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain’.342
I argue that this is merely verbal agreement, for Mill actually had43
a very different understanding of pleasure to Bentham’s, even before44
introducing his famous distinction between higher and lower pleasures.45
For Bentham, the principle of utility or greatest happiness meant46
promoting the balance of pleasures over pains. Bentham understood47
pleasures and pains as mental states or, as he puts it, ‘interesting48
perceptions’4 which are distinct from their causes.5 Thus it is, for49
example, that he distinguishes four sources of pleasure – physical,50
political, moral and religious6 – and notes that fecundity and purity51
(two elements of his Felicific Calculus) ‘are in strictness scarcely to be52
deemed properties of the pleasure or the pain itself . . . [but] properties53
only of the act, or other event, by which such pleasure or pain has54
been produced’.7 It is easy to see how assessing actions by the pleasure55
and pain produced is evaluating them by their consequences and why56
Bentham famously held that, when the value of pleasure produced is57
the same, pushpin is as good as poetry.858
This is Bentham’s understanding of pleasure, but the term ‘hedonism’59
comes from the Greek hedone9 and, in the Greeks, we find a different60
idea of pleasure – not a mental state that is consequent upon action61
but the pleasurable action itself. For instance, in Glaucon’s typology of62
goods in Book II of Plato’s Republic he lists, as examples of things good63
in themselves, ‘joy and harmless pleasures’,10 meaning that pleasurable64
activities, such as reading, are seen as intrinsically good, rather than65
2 A. J. Ayer, ‘The Principle of Utility’, Philosophical Essays (London, 1954), pp. 264–7.
3 J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Roger Crisp (Oxford, 1998), II.2.4–5. References to
Utilitarianism are by chapter, paragraph and line numbers.
4 Jeremy Bentham,An Introduction to the Principles ofMorals and Legislation [IPML],
ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart (Oxford, 1996), V.1, p. 42.
5 Bentham, IPML, VI.1, p. 51.
6 Bentham, IPML, III.2, p. 34.
7 Bentham, IPML, IV.6, p. 39.
8 J. S. Mill, ‘Bentham’, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. J. M. Robson
(Toronto, various dates) X.113. All references to Mill’s works, other than Utilitarianism,
are by chapter and paragraph (where relevant) and to the volume and page number of
this edition.
9 Roger Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism (London, 1997), p. 21.
10 Plato, Republic, trans. G. M. A. Grube, rev. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis, 1992), 327b.
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merely instrumentally productive of pleasure. Similarly, in Aristotle,66
we learn that eudaimonia or happiness consists in virtuous or excellent67
activity and ‘pleasures . . . are activities, and an end [in themselves]’.1168
Both senses of ‘pleasure’ survive in English: we can say either69
‘punting gives me pleasure’ or ‘punting is one of my pleasures’.1270
The former construes pleasure as Bentham did, as a mental state71
consequence of the activity, while the latter identifies pleasure with the72
activity itself. If Mill adhered strictly to his Benthamite upbringing,73
then we may expect him to have shared Bentham’s mental state74
conception of pleasures; but we already know that Mill broke from75
the Benthamite hedonism he had inherited and the fact that he was76
clearly influenced by his classical Greek education makes it plausible77
that he could have meant the latter.13 The next section concerns what78
Mill may have meant by pleasure.79
III. DID MILL UNDERSTAND PLEASURE AS A MENTAL80
STATE OR ACTIVITY?81
Having noted the same ambiguity, Roger Crisp tentatively concludes82
that Mill intended by ‘pleasure’ the pleasurable experience, or mental83
state, of punting, as opposed to the pleasurable activity (or ‘pleasure84
source’) itself. I grant that there is textual support for this reading,85
most notably, as Crisp points out, Mill’s tendency to contrast pleasures86
to pains.14 Crisp contends that ‘you may say that punting is one of your87
pleasures, but not that housework is one of your pains’15 and, since88
‘pains’ only covers the mental state but not the activity or experience89
itself, he concludes that ‘pleasure’ is presumably used in the same way.90
Given Mill’s ambiguity, I can be no more confident in my interpretation91
than Crisp, but I am inclined to read Mill the other way. As we can92
say either that punting is a pleasure or that it gives us pleasure, so we93
can say (as Crisp notes) that housework is a pain or causes us pain.94
That we do not tend to say ‘housework is one of my pains’ may be95
no more than a curiosity of the English language – I would certainly96
understand a foreigner who said it and, perhaps, not even consider his97
unusual expression wrong.98
It is far from clear that Mill meant to refer only to mental states, as99
opposed to pleasurable activities, and other readers seem to favour100
11 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. T. Irwin (Indianapolis, 1985), 1153a9-11.
12 This is noted by Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism, p. 26.
13 See Geraint Williams, ‘The Greek Origins of J. S. Mill’s Happiness’, Utilitas 8 (1996);
Jonathan Riley, ‘Millian Qualitative Superiorities and Utilitarianism, Part I’, Utilitas 20
(2008), pp. 271–5.
14 Mill, Utilitarianism, e.g. II.4, 8 and 12, and IV.5 and 10–11.
15 Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism, p. 27.
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the activity interpretation.16 Immediately after subscribing himself101
to the view that happiness consists in pleasure and the absence of102
pain, Mill cautioned that ‘much more needs to be said; in particular,103
what things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure’,17 thereby104
warning his reader that he may be about to break from the Benthamite105
position he had seemingly endorsed. Mill adds that all desirable106
things ‘are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves,107
or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of108
pain’.18 This distinguishes things that are desirable in themselves,109
because of the pleasure inherent in them, from those that are merely110
instrumental to the promotion of pleasure. The latter category is111
familiar and might include, for example, education which, though not112
intrinsically enjoyable, allows us later to enjoy the pleasures of poetry.113
The implication, however, is that some activities may be desirable other114
than instrumentally – so punting, unlike education, may be desirable115
because it is itself a pleasure. If one conceives of pleasure as a mental116
state, then all activities would be desirable only instrumentally; but117
then it would be odd to say that pleasure is desirable because of the118
pleasure inherent in it. It seems the best way to interpret this passage119
is to assume Mill holds certain activities intrinsically desirable because120
they are pleasures (i.e. for the pleasure inherent in them, as opposed121
to the mental state produced by them).122
This interpretation seems further supported by what Mill says in his123
‘proof’, where he remarks that:124
The ingredients of happiness are very various, and each of them is desirable in125
itself, and not merely when considered as swelling an aggregate. The principle126
of utility does not mean that any given pleasure, as music, for instance, or any127
given exemption from pain, as for example health, are to be looked upon as128
means to a collective something termed happiness, and to be desired on that129
account. They are desired and desirable in and for themselves; besides being130
means, they are a part of the end.19131
Here, Mill speaks of music as a pleasure, rather than merely a132
cause of pleasurable experiences. Moreover, it seems more plausible133
to think that various different activities or experiences, each desirable134
in themselves, may unite to constitute a happy life, than to say this135
of pleasurable mental states, which it may be more natural to suppose136
16 E.g. David Brink, ‘Mill’s Deliberative Utilitarianism’, Philosophy & Public Affairs
21 (1992), pp. 72–8 (though he restricts hedonism to mental state accounts of pleasure);
John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass., 2007),
p. 259; Levine, Engaging Political Philosophy, pp. 141–2.
17 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.2.6–7.
18 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.2.12–14.
19 Mill, Utilitarianism, IV.5.19–25.
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homogeneous.20 The same analysis could be applied to virtue, although137
Mill actually says only that the ‘consciousness of it is a pleasure’21138
(which not only suggests a mental state conception of pleasure but also139
seems unlikely to satisfy his opponents who insisted that virtue itself140
was a good).141
I believe that this interpretation of pleasures, as describing142
pleasurable activities, rather than mere mental states, better makes143
sense of Mill’s understanding of pleasure and happiness as a whole, as144
will, I hope, become clear through the remainder of this article. I think,145
for example, that we can better understand Mill’s distinction between146
higher and lower pleasures and remarks about various pleasures if147
‘pleasures’ refers to different activities, rather than merely mental148
states.22 Moreover, this interpretation is plausible because it is true149
to Mill’s Greek influences and charitable because – as I will argue150
below – it appears to overcome some common objections to hedonism151
(although not ones that Mill himself considered). None of these reasons152
offer conclusive evidence for my interpretation, but it is at least153
possibly what Mill had in mind, if he meant anything consistently.154
I hope that, if the following remarks make sense of Mill’s thought155
consistently with this reading, that offers further support for it; but156
the below arguments do not depend on any particular understanding of157
pleasures.158
IV. HIGHER AND LOWER PLEASURES INTRODUCED159
Mill’s most famous departure from Bentham is his qualitative160
distinction between pleasures. Bentham held that all activities are to161
be assessed by the quantity of pleasure produced, a factor of their162
intensity and duration, and thus, when the quantity of pleasure is163
the same, pushpin is as good as poetry – the source of the pleasure164
making no difference to its value. In fact, Bentham was no great fan165
of poetry,23 whereas Mill – who regarded its appreciation as one of166
the key factors in his recovery from depression24 – was and wanted167
to defend it as more valuable than the mere bodily sensations or168
20 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.8.11–12 insists that ‘Neither pains nor pleasures are
homogeneous’. Of course, it is possible that pleasurable mental states might be
heterogeneous, for instance if they shared some quality that made them pleasant but
others that distinguished them. Nonetheless, one could suppose (falsely I believe) that
there is some particular mental state common to all activities we call pleasant. It seems
more obvious that pleasurable activities differ in kind.
21 Mill, Utilitarianism, IV.8.6.
22 Of course, a certain mental state may also be necessary. Reading or punting
could hardly be classed as a pleasure if one did not enjoy it. Cf. Brink, ‘Deliberative
Utilitarianism’, pp. 74–6.
23 Rawls, Lectures, p. 261. Cf. Mill, ‘Bentham’, Collected Works, X.113.
24 J. S. Mill, Autobiography, V, Collected Works, I.149–57.
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pleasures enjoyed by children and lower animals and, thereby, show169
that hedonistic utilitarianism was not merely a ‘doctrine worthy only170
of swine’25 but capable of incorporating the ‘finer things’ in life.26171
Mill’s solution to these problems was that we may prefer a lesser172
amount of the pleasure of poetry to a greater amount of pushpin-173
pleasure because the former is superior in kind or quality, i.e. a ‘higher174
pleasure’.175
The first thing to stress is that Mill does not say there are two kinds of176
pleasure, ‘higher’ and ‘lower’.27 What he says is that one pleasure may177
be superior in quality to another and that we prefer pleasures that178
involve our higher faculties. This does not imply any sharp dividing179
line between those pleasures that employ higher faculties and those180
that do not – there can be a continuum of pleasures, according to a181
continuum either of faculties or of differences in the extent to which182
our higher faculties are involved in any activity. Thus, rather than183
thinking of higher and lower as denoting two kinds of pleasures, it184
is more useful to think of them as comparative terms, like taller or185
shorter. (An important difference is that there is only one way in which186
one thing may be taller than another, whereas there may be different187
ways for one pleasure to be higher than another – employing different188
higher faculties. Nonetheless, the point here is that we cannot, strictly,189
speak of pleasures as ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ in isolation; we always need190
another to compare to.) For any two persons, we can usually say that191
one is taller than the other (or that they are about equal) and, though we192
can loosely categorize people as simply ‘tall’ or ‘short’, we can always193
say that a tall person is shorter than an even taller person. So it is,194
I contend, with pleasures. Chess is higher than draughts (checkers),195
which in turn is higher than pushpin; or poetry may be called a196
higher pleasure, but philosophy still higher. Many questions remain197
about this doctrine, including whether it is compatible with hedonism198
(an issue addressed below). More immediately, however, we want to199
know what makes one pleasure higher than another and how it is200
that we know; the following section tackles these questions in reverse201
order.202
25 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.3.5.
26 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.1; compare IV.5–8. ‘Fine’ or ‘noble’ often translate the Greek
kalon, which combined both moral and aesthetic ideals.
27 This interpretation is also offered by Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism, p. 30, but
contradicts that of Rawls, Lectures, pp. 259–63. Rawls’s lectures date from 1994, so
do not reflect recent scholarship. Nor should his undergraduate lectures be taken as his
final thoughts on these topics. Nonetheless, on this point they seem clearly wrong, and
it is a mistake often made by undergraduates. I also reject the claim of Jonathan Riley,
‘Is Qualitative Hedonism Inconsistent?’, Utilitas 11 (1999), p. 355 that there are two or
more discrete classes of pleasure.
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V. COMPETENT JUDGES203
On the epistemological question, Mill appeals to the preferences of204
competent judges:205
On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or which of two206
modes of existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral207
attributes and from its consequences, the judgment of those who are qualified208
by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, must209
be admitted as final.28210
I believe it is fruitful to compare this to what Hume says about211
aesthetic matters in his essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. There Hume,212
a forerunner to Mill in both the utilitarian and empiricist traditions,213
observes that, despite variety of tastes:214
Whoever would assert an equality of genius and elegance between OGILBY and215
MILTON, or BUNYAN and ADDISON, would be thought to defend no less an216
extravagance, than if he maintained a mole-hill to be as high as TENERIFFE,217
or a pond as extensive as the ocean. Though there may be found persons, who218
give preference to the former authors; no one pays attention to such a taste;219
and we pronounce without scruple the sentiment of these pretended critics to220
be absurd and ridiculous.29221
Hume therefore sets out to find ‘a rule, by which the various sentiments222
of men may be reconciled; at least, a decision, afforded, confirming one223
sentiment, and condemning another’.30 Hume holds that:224
Though it be certain that, beauty and deformity, more than sweet and bitter,225
are not qualities in objects, but belong entirely to the sentiment, internal or226
external; it must be allowed, that there are certain qualities in objects, which227
are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings.31228
And:229
Though some objects, by the structure of the mind, be naturally calculated to230
give pleasure, it is not to be expected, that in every individual the pleasure will231
be equally felt.32232
This is why we face such diversity of opinion, so recognition of true233
beauty (or its causes) comes about only over time33 or from competent234
critics. As Hume remarks on the latter:235
[A] true judge in the finer arts is observed, even in the most polished ages, to236
be so rare a character; Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by237
28 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.8.2–6.
29 David Hume, ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, ed.
E. F. Miller (Indianapolis, 1985), pp. 230–1.
30 Hume, ‘Standard of Taste’, p. 229.
31 Hume, ‘Standard of Taste’, p. 235.
32 Hume, ‘Standard of Taste’, p. 234.
33 Hume, ‘Standard of Taste’, p. 233.
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practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle238
critics to this valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they239
are found, is the true standard of taste and beauty.34240
While Mill says little to elaborate on his idea of competent judges, it is241
reasonable to assume he had something similar in mind – they must242
be ‘equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and243
enjoying, both’35 of the pleasures and unprejudiced, for example, by244
‘any feeling of moral obligation’.36245
It should be noted that Mill’s criterion is not one of what economists246
call ‘revealed preference’. The mere fact that we sometimes choose one247
pleasure over another does not suffice to show that it is higher or,248
since we sometimes choose poetry over pushpin and sometimes pushpin249
over poetry, the relation ‘higher than’ would be symmetrical! What250
matters is a ‘decided preference’37 or judgement, not a choice made251
from ‘infirmity of character’,38 which may be for an acknowledged lesser252
good. Thus Mill can accept that even competent judges, when they are253
tired of poetry, may turn to pushpin. Indeed, it is necessary for one to254
be a competent judge that one has ample experience of both pleasures255
to compare.256
Both Hume’s and Mill’s judges play only an epistemic or evidential257
role.39 It is by their verdict that we can know one pleasure higher than258
another, but it is not their verdict that makes it so. The appropriate259
model is what Rawls calls an ‘imperfect procedure’, such as a jury260
trial, in which there is an independently right answer that the judges261
try to identify.40 For Hume, what makes one piece of art better than262
another is that it is better fitted to produce pleasure in the human263
mind. For Mill, something similar is true. He supposes it is simply ‘an264
unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and265
equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both [pleasures], do give266
a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs267
their higher faculties’.41 This comes very close to what Rawls calls268
the Aristotelian Principle, which states that ‘other things being equal,269
human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their270
innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the271
34 Hume, ‘Standard of Taste’, p. 241.
35 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.6.1–2.
36 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.5.5–6.
37 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.5.5.
38 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.7.4.
39 This is also the interpretation of Brink, ‘Deliberative Utilitarianism’, p. 80.
40 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. edn. (Cambridge, Mass., 1999), pp. 74–5.
41 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.6.1–4.
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capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity’.42 For Rawls, this is272
simply a natural fact of human psychology, confirmed by observation,273
and so it is for Mill, though he connects it to ‘a sense of dignity’.43 If274
this is what makes one pleasure higher than another, then it is possible275
that even competent judges can be wrong – something Mill explicitly276
allows for, when he says we must accept a majority if they disagree.44277
It is possible that even the majority of such judges could be wrong; Mill278
does not say that they are necessarily right, merely that ‘there can be279
no appeal’45 – as it is in the highest court.280
VI. IS MILL STILL A HEDONIST?281
It is now clear, I hope, what Mill meant by higher and lower pleasures,282
but not whether he could consistently maintain such position while283
remaining a hedonist. Of course, Mill will not count as a hedonist,284
on my reading, if we restrict hedonism to the view that only mental285
states can be of intrinsic value.46 Given that the English ‘pleasures’ may286
naturally refer to activities, rather than mental states, I see no reason287
for such a restriction. In any case, my concern here is not whether Mill’s288
general conception of pleasure is genuinely hedonistic, but whether he289
can consistently distinguish higher and lower pleasures without appeal290
to some other value.291
Many critics attacked Mill on this point, starting with the earliest292
receptions of Mill’s distinction. Bradley, for instance, remarked:293
If you are to prefer a higher pleasure to a lower without reference to294
quantity – then there is an end altogether of the principle which puts the295
measure in the surplus of pleasure to the whole sentient creation. It is no296
use saying all pleasures are ends, only some are more ends . . . Given a small297
quantity of higher pleasure in collision with a large quantity of lower, how can298
you decide between them? To work out the sum you must reduce the data to299
the same denomination. You must go to quantity or nothing; you decline to go300
to quantity, and hence you can not get any result.47301
42 Rawls, Theory, p. 374. Rawls only calls the principle Aristotelian, rather than
Aristotle’s, but his footnote also acknowledges how close Mill comes to expressing the
same idea.
43 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.6.26.
44 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.8.6. Since they are, by hypothesis, competent judges, we can
assume Condorcet’s Jury Theorem applies.
45 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.8.1–2.
46 Brink, ‘Deliberative Utilitarianism’, p. 71.
47 F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1927), p. 119. It may be reasonable
to suppose that you need some exchange rate to adjudicate between quantity and quality,
but it is unreasonable to assume that must be quantity, since this neglects quality
altogether.
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While Carritt asserted that:302
[F]or those who maintain that pleasure alone is in any sense ‘good’, to303
distinguish some pleasures as bad is a manifest absurdity. ‘Superior pleasure’304
either means greater quantity of pleasure or it implies some quality other305
than pleasantness as the standard of selection . . . [which] is no better than306
to say, ‘I care for nothing but money, but it must be honestly come by’. The307
only consistent hedonist is one who seeks pleasures solely according to their308
quantity . . . acknowledging that the objects which afford them are irrelevant.48309
And:310
If pleasure is the only thing we owe to others, then it is its quantity only311
and not its quality which we must consider. We ought only to spread a taste312
for music and poetry, instead of beer and skittles, so far as we are assured313
that the aesthetic pleasures are keener, less mixed, and more permanent. If314
the utilitarian grants that to enjoy Homer and Shakespeare is ‘better’ than to315
enjoy the serio-comic and the moving pictures, he seems to admit a ‘good’ which316
he ought to produce but which is assessed by something else than an amount317
of pleasure.49318
It should be noted that there have been more sympathetic com-319
mentators, who have pointed out that pleasures may differ, just as320
colours differ in shade.50 My aim in this section is to show that there is321
indeed room for one to care only about pleasures, but still distinguish322
between them according to quality.323
It will be helpful to begin with an analogy. Consider what I call a324
Bacchant, i.e. someone who cares only about wine. It is important to be325
aware that this person cares about wine in itself and not consequent326
pleasure, so is undeterred by, for example, the prospect of a hangover.327
Such a person cares about the quantity of wine – that is, they always328
want more wine rather than less, ceteris paribus – but they also care329
about its quality. (I assume that their tastes track an objective feature330
of the wine, which I think is more analogous to Mill’s view, but this is331
not necessary for my present purposes – ‘quality’ can be understood as332
referring to subjective preference.) Although, other things being equal,333
they always prefer more wine to less, if we offer them a choice between334
a bottle of inferior wine and a glass of superior wine, it is possible that335
they will prefer the glass of superior wine. This does not seem strange336
and, as Mill observes, ‘It would be absurd that while, in estimating all337
other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation338
48 E. F. Carritt, The Theory of Morals (London, 1928), p. 21.
49 Carritt, Theory, p. 43.
50 E.g. C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London, 1930), p. 232; Riley, ‘Is
Qualitative Hedonism Inconsistent?’, p. 354. Cf. Guy Fletcher, ‘The Consistency of
Qualitative Hedonism and the Value of (at Least Some) Malicious Pleasures’, Utilitas 20
(2008), pp. 465–6.
J. S. Mill’s Conception of Utility 11
of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.’51 It is339
worth noting that even Bentham was happy to speak of both quality340
and quantity in relation to knowledge and punishment.52341
Let us now consider the famous ‘Haydn and the oyster’ example.53342
In this somewhat fanciful case, an angel offers you the choice between343
the life of the composer Haydn or that of an oyster, capable of no more344
than the basest pleasures, but will allow you to live as an oyster for as345
long as you like. Since Haydn will live only seventy-seven years, and346
thus experience only a finite amount of pleasure, if you care only about347
quantity of pleasure, then at some point the life of the oyster – which348
accumulates pleasure at a much slower rate – will eventually seem349
preferable. Note that it is no solution to say we prefer the life with the350
highest average, rather than total, for that faces a reverse problem –351
it would imply that we would prefer to be Haydn for a second than an352
almost-equally gifted composer who lives for one hundred years.353
To illustrate the problem with wine, suppose that Haydn’s glass is354
filled quickly (mirroring the intensity of pleasure in his life), while355
wine drips very slowly into the oyster’s – if you pour the oyster wine356
over a much longer duration, it will eventually come to have a greater357
quantity. However, if we suppose Haydn not only gets poured wine358
more quickly, but gets poured better wine, then it may be rational to359
prefer Haydn’s glass, even if the quantity is less. So it is with pleasure –360
if Haydn gets a superior quality of pleasure, then it may be rational –361
even for someone who cares only about pleasure – to prefer that smaller362
quantity of higher pleasure to a larger quantity (in terms of intensity363
and duration) of inferior pleasure. Just as one can be a Bacchant while364
caring about quality as well as quantity of wine, so one can still be a he-365
donist while caring about quality as well as quantity of pleasure. As Mill366
says, ‘It is quite compatible with the principle of utility [and hedonism,367
which he does not clearly distinguish] to recognise the fact, that some368
kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others.’54369
It should be clear that quality is a genuinely different scale than370
quantity and not simply to be reduced to the latter,55 even in infinite371
amounts.56 It may, of course, be thought that higher pleasures will372
51 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.4.28–30.
52 Bentham, IMPL, VI.11, p. 55 and XIV.22, p. 171.
53 Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism, p. 24.
54 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.4.26–8.
55 Ayer, ‘The Principle of Utility’, p. 252; cf. Bradley, Ethical Studies, pp. 118–19
‘[S]ince the moral “higher” is here, as we see, the more pleasurable or the means to the
more pleasurable, we come in the end to the amount, the quantity of pleasure without
distinction of kind or quality; and having already seen that such an end is not a moral
end, we get nothing from the phrases “higher” and “lower” unless it be confusion’.
56 The view that superiority in quality amounts to an infinite (or indefinite) superiority
in quantity is defended by Jonathan Riley, ‘On Quantities and Qualities of Pleasure’,
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generally be more intense or productive of future pleasures. One might,373
for example, have many good extrinsic reasons to prefer poetry to374
pushpin – for instance, because it can be enjoyed alone and one is375
less likely to tire of it. Mill notes that previous utilitarian writers have376
successfully established the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures377
on grounds of safety, permanence, etc.,57 but he aims to offer a more378
principled defence, abstracting from these circumstantial advantages379
(much as Plato strips justice of its circumstantial advantages – such380
as reputation – in the Republic). If the advantages of higher pleasures381
lay simply in such matters as their permanence or future effects, then382
one would have no reason to prefer poetry to pushpin the night before383
one’s execution, if the quantity of pleasure was the same. Mill, however,384
would say that poetry is intrinsically preferable because, whatever the385
amount of pleasure involved, it is a better-quality pleasure.58386
On this reading, quantity and quality are two independent properties387
of pleasures that must be traded off (as I show below) when choosing388
between pleasures. Scarre objects to Donner’s similar view, pointing out389
that we don’t think a fine claret better than a mediocre one because it390
possesses more of some good-making property ‘quality’.59 Quality is not,391
however, some basic good-making property. Rather, it is a conclusion of392
our evaluative judgements; when we judge one thing’s natural proper-393
ties make it a better instance of its kind, according to the appropriate394
standards, we attribute superiority in quality. Thus, one wine is not bet-395
ter than another because it possesses some peculiar property ‘quality’,396
but calling it higher quality is shorthand for saying that it has other397
properties that would make us prefer it, even in smaller quantities.398
Similarly, one pleasure is higher than another not because it possesses399
some general property ‘quality’ but because it better contributes to a400
eudaimonistic conception of happiness, and thus we attribute higher401
quality to it. This could be called a ‘buck-passing’ account of quality.60402
Mill’s qualitative distinction between pleasures solves problems of403
the Haydn and the oyster sort, and I shall argue below that it also404
solves at least one other well-known difficulty for hedonism, but that405
does not imply that it is not genuinely a form of hedonism. Nor, of406
course, is it to say that all the distinctive problems with Mill’s own407
Utilitas 5 (1993), pp. 291–5; ‘Is Qualitative Hedonism Inconsistent?’, pp. 347–51;
‘Qualitative Superiorities, I’, pp. 269–71. This also has obvious implications for the trade-
off between higher and lower pleasures.
57 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.4.20–25.
58 I thank Chris Brooke for prompting me to stress this point.
59 Geoffrey Scarre, ‘Donner and Riley on Qualitative Hedonism’, Utilitas 9 (1997),
pp. 354–5.
60 After T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass., 1998),
pp. 95–100.
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version of hedonism have been – or can be – solved. In particular, it408
remains to be seen whether we can distinguish intensity and quality409
and how we can balance between them.410
VII. BALANCING HIGHER AND LOWER PLEASURES411
Mill defends his appeal to competent judges by noting that even those412
who do not distinguish higher and lower pleasures will need, ultimately,413
to make similar appeals:414
[T]here needs be the less hesitation to accept this judgment respecting the415
quality of pleasures, since there is no other tribunal to be referred to even on416
the question of quantity. What means are there of determining which is the417
acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations, except the418
general suffrage of those who are familiar with both?61419
If this were so, then it would be difficult or impossible to tell whether420
competent judges had preferred one pleasure because they thought421
it simply more intense (greater in quantity) or superior in kind422
(qualitatively higher). With wine, we can easily observe quantity, so423
if someone chooses a smaller quantity we must suppose it is because424
she thinks it a better wine. With pleasures that others enjoy, we can425
only observe their duration, and thus have no good idea of either total426
quantity (which depends also on intensity) or quality. It may seem,427
therefore, that Mill has no way to distinguish his quality criterion428
from simple intensity; however, perhaps intensity is not something429
that needs to be judged by others – maybe each person can be taken as430
an infallible judge of the intensity of his or her own pleasure – while431
judgements of quality depend on the cultivation of higher faculties, so432
people may be mistaken. Put another way: I cannot be mistaken about433
what I like, but I can be about what is actually better for me.434
In any case, the question still arises how to balance higher and lower435
pleasures. This problem for Mill is, in some respects, similar to the436
controversy over ‘dominant end’ and ‘inclusive end’ interpretations of437
Aristotle’s eudaimonia.62 The question is whether higher and lower438
pleasures can be traded off against each other or we always want more439
of the highest good, such that it exhibits lexical dominance63 over the440
lower. This means that the highest good is to be maximized before the441
lower comes into play, as a tie-breaker between activities that are equal442
at first. Rawls’s example of lexical ordering is words in a dictionary, but443
61 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.8.7–11.
62 E.g. Thomas Nagel, ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia’, Phronesis 17 (1972); J. L. Ackrill,
‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia’, Proceedings of the British Academy 60 (1974).
63 This phrase comes from Rawls, Theory, pp. 37–8, and is used by Crisp, Mill on
Utilitarianism, p. 40.
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another might be football league tables – positions are determined by444
points scored and then goal difference, and points lexically dominate445
goal difference, since the latter only ever breaks ties and can never446
overcome a difference in points.447
Some construe Mill’s doctrine lexically; that is, as saying that any448
amount of higher pleasure is always to be preferred to any amount of449
lesser pleasure.64 He does indeed say that ‘It is better to be a human450
being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied451
than a fool satisfied’,65 which lends credence to such an interpretation.452
Mill’s doctrine is that the pig or fool is content merely because he does453
not know his imperfections or the higher things that the intelligent454
man desires, but this mere subjective contentment is not to be confused455
with true happiness, which involves the exercise and realization of one’s456
higher faculties.66 If this was so, however, it might lead to somewhat457
bizarre conclusions, such as that the ideal life involves putting aside not458
only bodily pleasures – at least, so far as humanly possible – but even459
poetry in preference to maximizing one’s philosophical fulfilment. This460
would seem not only counter-intuitive to us but also to conflict with461
Mill’s liberal commitments to diversity and experiments in living.67462
It is not obvious that Mill had such lexical dominance in mind. The463
plausibility of such a reading is, I think, weakened by the recognition464
that higher and lower pleasures are ordered along a scale of quality,465
rather than being two (or more) distinct kinds of pleasure. Moreover,466
what Mill actually says is that:467
If one of the two [pleasures] is, by those who are competently acquainted with468
both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing469
it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it470
for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are471
justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far472
outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.68473
Whether such a discontinuity is possible has been the focus of much474
discussion;69 my aim is not to defend its truth, but merely to offer the475
most plausible and consistent interpretation of Mill – which requires476
only that some pleasures may be like this, and not that all higher477
64 E.g. Brink, ‘Deliberative Utilitarianism’, pp. 72 and 92; Riley, ‘On Qualities and
Quantities’, pp. 295–6 and ‘Qualitative Superiorities, I’, p. 269; Rawls, Lectures, pp. 261–
3.
65 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.6.40–42.
66 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.6.33–34.
67 J. S. Mill, On Liberty, III.1, Collected Works, XVIII.261.
68 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.5.6–13. Emphasis added.
69 Jesper Ryberg, ‘Higher and Lower Pleasures – Doubts on Justification’, Ethical
Theory and Moral Practice 5 (2002); Wlodek Rabinowicz, ‘Ryberg’s Doubts About Higher
and Lower Pleasures – Put to Rest?’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2003); Gustaf
Arrhenius and Wlodek Rabinowicz, ‘Millian Superiorities’, Utilitas 17 (2005).
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pleasures are incommensurably superior to lower ones. Though saying478
that lower pleasures are of ‘small account’ is consistent with their479
lexical domination (as goal difference is of small account compared480
to points scored in football leagues), Mill does not say that this is481
always the case or, indeed, that it is ever so. I think the attention that482
has been given to cases concerning infinite amounts70 is misplaced,483
since Mill only says ‘any quantity of the other pleasure which their484
nature is capable of’,71 and finite human beings are obviously not485
capable of infinite amounts of pleasure. All Mill actually requires486
is that the pleasure of reading poetry would always outweigh any487
amount of pushpin-pleasure one was capable of, given the natural488
limits of human lifespan and attention. This does not commit him to489
saying that the poetry-pleasure would outweigh an infinite amount of490
pushpin-pleasure, were that possible. One may still find it implausible491
that five minutes of reading Shakespeare’s sonnets could really be492
better than any amount of pleasure that one could get from a whole493
lifetime of playing pushpin (though this will presumably be limited, as494
diminishing returns set it), but this is Mill’s view – it is better to enjoy495
some realization of one’s higher faculties than to live like a contented496
pig or child.72497
Mill’s statement about higher pleasures trumping lower ones is a498
hypothetical, merely allowing for the possibility that one pleasure is so499
superior to another as to render quantity irrelevant. He never says that500
all differences in quality are so great as to render quantity irrelevant.501
It is therefore no embarrassment to his view that, as Ryberg notes,502
we also have preferences that do not exhibit this discontinuity.73 Mill’s503
allowance that great differences in quality may trump any difference in504
quantity has seemingly misled many commentators into supposing that505
all differences in quality do so, thereby producing a lexical hierarchy506
of pleasures,74 but this is plainly not Mill’s intention. Moreover, since507
he motivates the qualitative distinction by analogy to other cases, we508
should remember that lexical dominance is not the usual pattern.509
Perhaps we may prefer any (small) quantity of a fine pre-phylloxera510
claret to any (large) amount of cheap plonk, but ordinarily there will511
come a point where we prefer more of a lesser wine to any given amount512
70 E.g. Riley, ‘On Qualities and Quantities’; Scarre, ‘Donner and Riley’, pp. 355–9; Riley
‘Is Qualitative Hedonism Inconsistent?’; Ryberg, ‘Doubts on Justification’.
71 Mill, Utilitarianism, II.5.10. Emphasis added. Ryberg, ‘Doubts on Justification’,
pp. 422–3, notes that it is unrealistic to assume away diminishing marginal utility,
but does so anyway.
72 I thank Roger Crisp for pressing me on this point.
73 Ryberg, ‘Doubts on Justification’, p. 419.
74 E.g. Riley, ‘On Qualities and Quantities’, pp. 291–6.
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of a better one, as is evident if we compare a thimble-full of the good513
wine to a bottle of wine that is only slightly worse in quality.514
VIII. ADVANTAGES OF MILL’S ACCOUNT515
I have already shown one advantage of Mill’s qualitative distinction,516
namely that it can distinguish between poetry and pushpin and thus517
resolve ‘Haydn and the oyster’-style problems. I want to suggest that518
Mill’s understanding of utility is also immune to one other well-known519
objection to hedonism, namely Nozick’s experience machine.75 Nozick520
asks us to imagine that ‘super-duper neuroscientists’ can plug us in to521
a virtual reality machine so perfect we can have any experiences we522
want – from writing a great novel to scoring the winning touchdown523
in the Superbowl – with the only drawback being that none of these524
experiences actually happen. The mental state hedonist is presumably525
committed to saying it would be better for you to plug into the526
experience machine, provided you could be suitably assured that it527
would continue to produce experiences at least as pleasurable as those528
you would expect from real life. Nozick argues that our intuitive529
reluctance to plug into such a machine shows that there is something530
else besides our subjective experiences that matters to us – we really531
care, for example, about how the world actually is.532
Mill has, I think, at least two responses to such an objection. Firstly, if533
he understands ‘pleasure’ to include an activity and not only a mental534
state, then he can reject the experience machine from the start. It535
may give you the illusory, subjective experience of punting, but if the536
pleasure is (or includes) the activity, rather than just the mental state,537
it cannot give you the pleasure of punting. This seems rather austere,538
if only because, however unattractive the experience machine may539
seem all things considered, I believe there is something to be said540
for it. Even if ‘pleasure’ is understood to include the activity or source,541
however, it need not be particularly ‘active’ in the ordinary sense of542
that word – watching television or reading a book is an activity, and543
so being plugged into the experience machine also counts as a kind of544
pleasurable activity, but a very different one from actually punting. It545
is enough for Mill to say that, while being plugged in to the experience546
machine constitutes a pleasurable experience, it is not the same as that547
of punting.548
Second, even if Mill did understand pleasure as simply a mental549
state, and so something that could in principle be provided by either550
a veridical experience or the experience machine, he could say that551
these experiences differ in kind. Recall that what makes one pleasure552
75 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford, 1974), pp. 42–5.
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higher than another is its exercise and realization of higher, human553
faculties. It is reasonable to suppose that there are higher faculties554
that we exercise only in real life and would not develop in an experience555
machine. Moreover, the way we know one pleasure to be higher than556
another is by appeal to competent judges. While the ‘decided preference’557
criterion is not satisfied by a mere intuitive repulsion to the experience558
machine, and there are in fact no judges acquainted with both reality559
and the experience machine, it is also reasonable to suppose that, if560
we had chance to try an experience machine, we might still exhibit561
a ‘decided preference’ for the pleasures of real activities, thus giving562
us grounds to believe them higher.76 Of course, as we might prefer an563
inferior wine, if it was not much worse and there was enough of it, there564
may be real lives so wretched that the experience machine would be565
preferable, but for most of us reality would be better. That is, to adapt566
Mill’s comparison between Socrates and the fool, it is better to live a567
real life dissatisfied than an illusory one contented.568
IX. CONCLUSION569
I have offered an interpretation of Mill which argues that his hedonism570
actually has more in common with Aristotle than with Bentham. I571
suggested, tentatively, that he understands pleasures not simply as572
mental states or internal experiences, but as activities that include573
their source – so it would be truer to Mill’s understanding to say574
‘poetry is one of my pleasures’, rather than ‘poetry gives me pleasure’.575
I have outlined an understanding of higher and lower pleasures that,576
in particular, emphasizes: the epistemic role of judges; that these are577
not two kinds of pleasure, but rather relative comparison of any two578
pleasures (which need not fit on a complete ordering); and that higher579
pleasures do not always dominate lower pleasures. I have argued that580
this is compatible with hedonism, because one who cares only about581
any particular X (e.g. pleasure) need not care only about the quantity582
of that X, if it also varies in quality, and that it solves several well-583
known problems that afflict cruder forms of hedonism.584
Although I cannot argue it here, I believe this interpretation of Mill585
is conformable with his wider moral and political theory, including his586
preference for liberal institutions.77 If what actually best promotes our587
well-being is an objective matter, and the verdict of even competent588
76 Such a response is suggested by Darwall, Philosophical Ethics, pp. 116–18, though
he suggests that because Mill values objects rather than mental states his doctrine is
hedonism in name only.
77 For an illuminating account of how Mill’s understanding of happiness fits his wider
political theory, see Brink, ‘Deliberative Utilitarianism’ (though I do not agree with it in
all aspects).
18 Ben Saunders
judges in our own time is merely evidential, then Mill’s worries about589
fallibility78 militate against imposing what we take to be higher590
pleasures on others. Just as Hume observes that the people of one591
age may be caught up in some temporary vogue, and so the true test592
of beauty is the test of time,79 so what best serves the interests of man593
as a progressive being can be established only by leaving people free to594
live as they will and observing which activities are deemed worthy of595
choice by people in all ages.596
I do not pretend that this interpretation is wholly without difficulties,597
or that Mill does not in places say seemingly contradictory things,598
but as he says: ‘The beliefs which we have most warrant for, have no599
safeguard to rest on, but a standing invitation to the whole world to600
prove them unfounded.’80 In that spirit, I await falsification by better601
interpretations.81602
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78 Mill, On Liberty, II.3–20, Collected Works, XVIII.229–43.
79 Hume, ‘Standard of Taste’, p. 233.
80 Mill, On Liberty, II.8; Collected Works, XVIII.232.
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